Jurisdiction—Service of Process on Foreign Corporation by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 40 Number 2 
6-1-1965 
Jurisdiction—Service of Process on Foreign Corporation 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Alaska Case Law, Jurisdiction—Service of Process on Foreign Corporation, 40 Wash. L. Rev. 392 
(1965). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol40/iss2/23 
This Alaska Case Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
ALASKA CASE LAW 1964-1965
JURISDICTION
Service of Process on Foreign Corporation. Alaska statutory pro-
visions for service of process on foreign corporations have been given
long-arm effect. The purchaser of a road scraper sued his vendor, the
distributor, for breach of warranty as to the condition of the scraper.
The distributor filed a third party complaint against a non-resident
manufacturer from which it had ordered and received equipment over
the course of several years under an exclusive distribution sales and
service agreement for the state of Alaska. Because the manufacturer
had no agent in Alaska on whom process could be served, copies of the
complaint and summons were delivered by the retailer to the State
Commissioner of Commerce, pursuant to statutory provisions for serv-
ing foreign corporations transacting business in Alaska. This service
was quashed by the superior court, and the retailer appealed. Held, the
"transaction of business" required by statute for state court jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations is equivalent to the "minimum contacts"
required by the due process clause of the federal constitution. Northern
Supply, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 397 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1965).
In 1960 the Alaska statute providing for service of process on the
Commissioner of Commerce as "agent" of a foreign corporation, section
10.05.642, was amended to reach not only those corporations "author-
ized to transact business in the state" but also those corporations "not
authorized to transact business in the state but doing so."' The legisla-
tive intent in enacting this amendment formed the issue in the principal
case.
Prior to amendment, service on a foreign corporation was possible
under section 10.05.642 only when the corporation was authorized to
transact business under Alaska's corporation law, section 10.05.597.2
'ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.642 (1962). "When a foreign corporation authorized to
transact business in the state, or not authorized to transact business in the state but
doing so, fails to appoint or maintain a registered agent in the state, or when a
registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered office, or
when the certificate of authority of a foreign corporation is suspended or revoked, the
commissioner is an agent upon whom process, notice, or demand may be served...."(Emphasis added to identify the portion included through amendment by Alaska Sess.
Laws 1960, ch. 25, § 3.)
2 "No foreign corporation may transact business in the state until it has procured
a certificate of authority from the commissioner ...." (1962).
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The court reasoned that the legislature intended, by the amendment,
to extend Alaska jurisdiction to include foreign corporations which
transact business in a manner too insubstantial to require authorization
under the state corporation law. Transaction of business, stated the
court, encompasses "all those activities which would subject a foreign
corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts when measured by the
outer limits of the due process clause of the federal constitution."3
The court then made a somewhat cursory examination of the local
activities of the foreign corporation in the principal case, and concluded
that these activities were sufficient to bring the manufacturer within
the ambit of due process. The court adopted the criteria formulated
in the United States Supreme Court opinions of Hanson v. Denckla,
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,5 and International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.' In particular the court found that the manufacturer had
"purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws;"
that witnesses and evidence could more conveniently be produced for
trial in Alaska; and that the "transaction out of which the claim...
arose had such a substantial connection with the state that it would
not be unfair and in violation of due process" to require the manufac-
turer to defend in Alaska." The court's failure to consider the facts
with particularity seems to detract from the clarity and force of its
decision.
In Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,8 the United States Su-
preme Court held that local distribution, by an independent retailer,
of products manufactured by a foreign corporation is by itself an
insufficient basis for exercise of jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
Cannon, however, must be qualified by the subsequent decisions in
Hanson, McGee, and International Shoe. Two of the most recent
federal cases which involved distributorship situations somewhat anal-
ogous to the facts in the principal case came to the same decision as
in Cannon.' These cases might be distinguished in that one preceded
both Hanson and McGee, and the other involved a consumer who was
himself not a resident of the state asserting jurisdiction. The underly-
8 397 P.2d at 1016-17.
&357 U.S. 235 (1958).
5 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
6 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7397 P2d at 1017.8 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
0 L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959);
LeVecke v. Griesedieck W Brewery Co., 233 F2d 722 (9th Cir. 1956).
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ing theme in both these cases, however, was that jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation could not constitutionally be predicated solely
upon the location of its products within the forum state, nor upon the
use of normal distribution channels within the state.
The latest federal decision involving state jurisdiction based on local
distribution by a foreign manufacturer is Sanders Associates, Inc. v.
Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co.'0 The manufacturer in Sanders super-
vised the local distributor's sale of its product to the government, lim-
ited the territorial franchise of the distributor, and supervised the
distributor's advertising, pricing, and servicing practices. The court
in Sanders found these incidents to be sufficient to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement of due process, and thus the state's jurisdiction was
established.
Insofar as the facts in the principal case are given in the opinion, they
coincide with the facts in Sanders. The factual setting is reported only
briefly, however, and the court merely characterized the manufacturer's
contacts with Alaska in language borrowed directly from the Hanson,
McGee, and International Shoe opinions. It may well be that this lack
of judicial objectivity is unavoidable, as the opinion in the leading case
of International Shoe could only define the jurisdictional test as "cer-
tain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'.""..
Assuming that there exists a point at which it seems necessary and
consonant with due process to assert jurisdiction over a foreign man-
ufacturer engaging in the local distribution of its product, that point
will be determined by the scope and nature of the manufacturer's
local activities. Because the court in the principal case fails to describe
those local activities sufficiently, the Alaska practitioner can only
discern from this decision that jurisdiction will be exercised up to
"the outer limits of the due process clause of the federal constitution."
EDIToR's NoE: The court's failure in the principal case to describe
the manufacturer's local activities with sufficient particularity was re-
solved by the lengthy opinion written four months later by Chief Justice
Nesbett in Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423 (Alaska 1965).
The Stephenson decision extended jurisdiction of the Alaska courts to
an Ohio manufacturer of an allegedly defective gas valve involved in a
gas explosion in Anchorage, even though the manufacturer had no agent
10304 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1962), 14 W REs. L. Rxv. 610 (1963).
"1 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
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in Alaska and its total sales for Alaska delivery never exceeded 0.12%
of its total annual gross sales volume. The opinion covered the instant
facts with particularity, and discussed in detail the International Skoe,
McGee, and Hanson decisions (as well as Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) and Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1§61)). The
court's decision seems to turn on-the doctrine of "estimate of the incon-
veniences," as the court found that "it would be far more convenient
for Duriron to defend the suits in Alaska than to defend in Ohio and
transport all of the witnesses to that state from Alaska," 401 P.2d at
430. If the location of the witnesses is to be the controlling factor in
determining the extent of jurisdiction of the Alaska courts, rarely will
Alaska courts lack jurisdiction hereafter.
TORTS
Municipal Liability--Natural Causes"-Climatic Conditions and
Vehicular Traffic. A municipality is generally not liable for injuries
which result from the "natural causes" of snow and ice on city side-
walks.' Three recent Alaska decisions held that pedestrian and vehicu-
lar traffic which caused rough surfaces on sidewalks and crosswalks
were also "natural causes."
In Hale v. City of Anckorage,2 plaintiff was injured when she slipped
on a rough surface of snow and ice on a sidewalk curb-cut. The rough-
ness of the sidewalk had been caused by pedestrian and automobile
traffic during periods of alternate thawing and freezing. In Morrison v.
City of Anchorage,3 plaintiff was injured while attempting to avoid a
slush-filled gutter as she stepped from an icy sidewalk. In Gunsolus v.
City of Fairbanks,' plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on an
icy manhole cover at a street intersection crosswalk. In all three cases
plaintiff sued a city for failing to remove snow and ice. Held: Pedes-
trian and vehicular travel which causes rough surfaces on sidewalks and
crosswalks, and rising temperatures which cause slushy gutters, are
"natural causes," and, unless an obstruction results, a city is not liable
for resulting injuries.
In Gilfilen v. City of Seward5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
119 McQumm, MUxiCiPAL CoIroRATIoNs § 54.84 n. 36, 37 (3d ed. 1950).
2 389 P2d 434 (Alaska 1964).
3 390 P2d 782 (Alaska 1964).
4 391 P2d 13 (Alaska 1964).
5 262 F.2d 864 (9th Cr. 1959).
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